By Chibuikem Diala
In 2025, Lagos was forced to confront a truth it has long avoided. Two major fire incidents-at Afriland Towers on Broad Street and the Great Nigeria Insurance Building (GNI Plaza)- claimed tens of lives in buildings assumed to be safe by virtue of their size, location, and regulatory approval. These were not informal structures hidden from oversight. They were prominent, professionally occupied high-rise buildings. Yet when fire broke out, systems failed, smoke overwhelmed escape routes, and people died.
This reality matters deeply for hotels. As a hospitality consultant, I am deeply concerned.
Hotels are spaces of trust. Guests sleep believing risks have been anticipated and mitigated on their behalf. Yet fire safety in many hotels today is less a functioning system and more an illusion of compliance -certificates framed on walls, extinguishers mounted for visibility rather than use, and safety plans that exist only on paper. Hoteliers, consultants, and builders know this truth, even when they choose not to confront it.
History has already warned us where this leads. On December 7, 1946, the Winecoff Hotel in Atlanta burned, killing 119 people in the deadliest hotel fire in U.S. history. The building was marketed as “absolutely fireproof,” yet it had no sprinklers, no fire alarm system, and only one narrow staircase for evacuation. In a cruel irony, the hotel’s original owners themselves died in the fire. Ownership, status, and familiarity with the building offered no protection. Fire exposed the deadly gap between assumed safety and real preparedness.
That gap remains visible today, far beyond Nigeria’s borders. Following the 21 January 2025 fire at the Grand Kartal Hotel in Turkey, authorities took decisive action. The hotel’s owners were arrested and later jailed, while the architect and local regulatory officials were invited for questioning.
Prosecutors focused on the absence of smoke detectors, sprinklers, functioning alarms, and emergency lighting in a hotel that was nearly full when at least 78 people died, most from smoke inhalation. The message was unmistakable: responsibility for hotel fire safety does not end with management; it extends to those who design, approve, and certify buildings as safe.
Fire safety rests on three inseparable foundations. The first is prevention—sound electrical systems, properly designed generator and kitchen areas, and buildings genuinely fit for hotel occupancy. Yet many hotels operate with improvised power solutions and infrastructure stretched far beyond its original intent.
The second foundation is detection and suppression. Alarms, extinguishers, hose reels, and sprinklers are meant to slow fire and buy time. In practice, many are expired, disconnected, poorly maintained, or deliberately disabled to avoid inconvenience.
Equipment that does not function in an emergency is not safety; it is decoration.
The final and most critical foundation is evacuation and human response. In both the Afriland and GNI fires, smoke—not flames—was the primary killer. Smoke disorients, suffocates, and overwhelms those who do not know where to go or who hesitate because no one is leading. In a hotel fire, guests follow staff, not exit signs.
Ultimately, responsibility rests with owners. Fire safety is not a facilities issue to be postponed; it is a leadership obligation. A hotel that cannot evacuate safely should not be operating at all.
From Winecoff to Kartalkaya to Lagos, the lesson is clear. No one knows who will die in a hotel fire—not the guest, not the staff member, not even the owner.
Fire does not choose its victims. Negligence does.
* Chibuikem Diala is the Managing Partner of Hotel Human Capital Strategy and Executive Director of the International Hospitality, Tourism & Sustainability Forum (IHTEF Africa).
